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Abstract: Evans & Levinson’s (E&L’s) major point is that human languages are intriguingly diverse rather than (like 
animal communication systems) uniform within the species. This does not establish a “myth” about language 
universals, or advance the ill-framed pseudo-debate over universal grammar. The target article does, however, repeat a 
troublesome myth about Fitch and Hauser’s (2004) work on pattern learning in cotton-top tamarins. 
 
The take-home message from the target article by 
Evans & Levinson (E&L) is not in their title but in 
their subtitle. They don’t show that language 
universals are a myth; their point is that what 
makes human languages really interesting for 
cognitive science is their diversity, not their 
uniformity. Boas would have endorsed this view, 
but it seems fresh and novel in the current context. 
You want species-wide universal grammar? Visit 
the zoo. Study puttynose monkeys (Arnold & 
Zuberbühler 2006), or your cat. What human 
beings bring to animal communication is not rigid 
universals but a flexible ability to employ any of a 
gigantic range of strikingly varied systems. That 
seems to be what E&L are saying. 
Regrettably, though, the authors repeat a 
wildly false claim about results on syntactic 
learning in nonhuman primates. E&L were 
apparently misled by a statement in the literature 
they critique: they cite Fitch and Hauser (2004) as 
having demonstrated that cotton-top tamarins have 
“impressive learning powers over FSGs [finite 
state grammars]” (sect. 6, para. 3). 
This meme is spreading, alarmingly: E&L 
even cite a paper by a brain researcher (Friederici 
2004) who is looking for distinct neural systems 
for processing FSGs on the one hand and PSGs 
(phrase-structure grammar) on the other. The truth 
is that no one has shown monkeys to have any 
general ability to learn finite-state (FS) languages. 
It is extremely unlikely that anyone ever will. FS 
parsing is powerful; it would suffice for pretty 
much all the linguistic processing that humans 
ever do. 
Reflect for a moment on the likelihood 
that tamarins could be habituated to strings 
matching this regular expression: 
a (c* d c* d c*)* a + b (c* d c* d c*)* b 
All such strings begin with either a or b; the 
middle is an indefinitely long stretch of c and d in 
random order, but always containing an even 
number of d; and strings end with whatever they 
began with (notice, an unbounded dependency!). 
This language has a very simple FSG, but 
passively learning it from being exposed to 
examples (acca, accdcccddcccccda; bdccccdb; 
acdccddcccddda . . .) is surely not plausible. 
Figuring out the grammar would surely be way 
beyond the abilities of any mammal other than a 
skilled human puzzle-solver with pencil and 
paper. 
People have unfortunately been confusing 
FS languages with a vastly smaller proper subset 
known as the strictly local (SL) languages (Pullum 
& Rogers 2006; Pullum & Scholz 2007; Rogers & 
Pullum 2007). Fitch and Hauser unwittingly 
encouraged the error by remarking that FSGs “can 
be fully specified by transition probabilities 
between a finite number of ‘states’ (e.g., 
corresponding to words or calls)” (Fitch & Hauser 
2004, p.  377). The equation of states with words 
here is an error. States in FSGs are much more 
abstract. Languages that can be described purely 
in terms of transitions between particular terminal 
symbols (words or calls or whatever) are SL 
languages. (It is not clear why Fitch and Hauser 
mentioned the orthogonal issue of transition 
probability.) 
The SL class is the infinite union of a 
hierarchy of SLk languages (k > 1), the k setting 
the maximal distance over which dependencies 
can be stated. The most basic SL languages are the 
SL2 languages, describable by finite sets of 
bigrams. The SL2 class is right at the bottom of 
several infinite hierarchies within the FS 
languages (see Pullum & Rogers [2006] or Rogers 
& Pullum [2007] for the mathematics). 
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Fitch and Hauser found that cotton-top 
tamarins could be habituated to an SL2 pattern, 
namely the one denoted by (ab)*. They remark 
that perhaps tamarins fail to learn non-FS PSG 
languages “because their ability to differentiate 
successive items is limited to runs of two” (Fitch 
& Hauser 2004, p. 379), conceding the point that a 
limitation to recognizing bigrams might well be 
involved. Their results do not in any way imply 
that monkeys can acquire arbitrary FS languages 
from exposure to primary data. They may not be 
much better at pattern learning than your cat. E&L 
have unfortunately contributed to the spread of a 
myth. 
As for the supposed myth of E&L’s title, 
that of language universals, we see little prospect 
of sensible debate at this stage. People trying to 
set one up usually depict a clash between 
Chomsky, who has purportedly “shown that there 
is really only one human language” (Smith 1999 
p. 1), and Joos, who is alleged to have claimed 
that languages may “differ from each other 
without limit and in unpredictable ways” (e.g., 
Smith 1999, p. 105). 
But Chomsky (in Kasher 1991, p. 26) says 
merely that if all parameters of syntactic variation 
are “reducible to lexical properties” and if we 
ignore all parameters that are so reducible (hence 
we ignore all parameters), there is no syntactic 
variation at all, so the number of distinct syntactic 
systems is 1. This is not an empirical claim about 
human languages; it is a tautology. And Joos 
(1966, p. 96), while setting a phonology paper in 
historical context, merely alluded to an “American 
(Boas) tradition” that valued cataloguing language 
features over explanatory speculation. The 
passage quoted does not endorse that tradition or 
extend it to syntax. 
It should be obvious that we must assume 
languages may differ in unpredictable ways: we 
do not know the limits of variation, so fieldwork 
often brings surprises. That was Boas’s point. But 
equally obviously, not all conceivable differences 
between languages will be attested. Logically 
there could be dekatransitive verbs (taking ten 
obligatory object NPs), but there are not, because 
using them would outstrip our cognitive resources. 
In that sense there will be all sorts of limits. 
This does not look like the seeds of an 
interesting debate, so it is just as well that E&L do 
not really try to pursue one. Their conclusions are 
not about universally quantified linguistic 
generalizations being mythical, but about how 
“the diversity of language is, from a biological 
point of view, its most remarkable property” (sect. 
8, para. 6, their thesis 1). That is an interesting 
thought, and it deserves extended consideration by 
linguistic and cognitive scientists. 
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